Dated July, 1740 "Thou shalt not steal." Exodus 20:15
CONTENTS
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Subject: An unjust usurping of our neighbor’s property
without his consent is forbidden by the eighth commandment.
This is one of the ten commandments
which constitute a summary of man’s duty, as revealed by God. God made many
revelations to the children of Israel in the wilderness by Moses. But this made
in the ten commandments is the chief. Most of those other revelations contained
ceremonial or judicial laws; but this contains the moral law. The most of those
other laws respected the Jewish nation; but here is a summary of laws binding on
all mankind. Those were to last till Christ should come, and have set up the
Christian church. These are of perpetual obligation, and last to the end of the
world. God everywhere, by Moses and the prophets, manifests a far greater regard
to the duties of these commands than to any of the rites of the ceremonial
law.
These commands were given at Mount Sinai, before any of
the precepts of the ceremonial or judicial laws. They were delivered by a great
voice out of the midst of fire, which made all the people in the camp tremble,
and afterwards were engraven on tables of stone, and laid up in the ark; the
first table containing the four first commandments; which teach our duty to God;
the second table containing the six last, which teach our duty to man. The sum
of the duties of the first table is contained in that which Christ says is the
first and great commandment of the law; Mat. 22:37, “Thou shalt love the Lord
thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.” The
sum of what is required in the second table, is what Christ calls the second
command, like unto the first; verse 39, “The second is like unto it, Thou shalt
love thy neighbour as thyself.”
Of the commands of this second table of the law, the
first (which is the fifth of the ten), refers to that honor which
is due to our neighbor; the second respects his life; the third his
chastity; the fourth his estate; the fifth his good name;
the sixth and last respects his possessions and enjoyments in general. It
is that command which respects our neighbor’s estate, and which is the
fourth command of the second table, and the eighth of the whole decalogue, on
which I am now to insist. And here I shall make the command itself, as the words
of it lie before us in the decalogue, my subject: and as the words of the
commandment are in the form of a prohibition, forbidding a certain kind of sin.
So I shall consider particularly what it is that this command forbids. The sin
that is forbidden in this command is called stealing; yet we cannot
reasonably understand it only of that act, which in the more ordinary and strict
sense of the word, is called stealing. But the iniquity which this command
forbids, may be summarily expressed thus: - An unjust usurping of our
neighbor’s property, without his consent.
So much is doubtless comprehended in the text; yet this
comprehends much more than is implied in the ordinary use of the word,
stealing; which is only a secret taking of that which is another’s from
his possession, without either his consent or knowledge. But the ten commands
are not to be limited to the strictest sense of the words, but are to be
understood in such a latitude, as to include all things that are of that nature
or kind. Hence Christ reproves the Pharisees’ interpretation of the sixth
command, Mat. 5:21, 22; and also their interpretation of the seventh command;
see verse 27, 28; by which it appears that the commands are not to be understood
as forbidding only these individual sins, which are expressly mentioned, in the
strictest sense of the expressions; but all other things of the same nature or
kind. - Therefore, what is forbidden in this command is all unjust usurpation of
our neighbor’s property. Here it may be observed, that an unjust usurpation of
our neighbor’s property is twofold; it may be, either by withholding what
is our neighbor’s, or by taking it from him.
SECTION I
The dishonesty of withholding what
is our neighbor’s.
There are many ways in which persons may unjustly usurp
their neighbor’s property, by withholding what is his due. But I shall
particularize only two things.
First, the
unfaithfulness of men in not fulfilling their engagements. Ordinarily
when men promise anything to their neighbor, or enter into engagements by
undertaking any business with which their neighbor entrust them, their
engagements invest their neighbor with a right to that which is engaged; so that
if they withhold it, they usurp that which belongs to their neighbor. So, when
men break their promises, because they find them to be inconvenient, and they
cannot fulfill them without difficulty and trouble; or merely because they have
altered their minds since they promised. They think they have not consulted
their own interest in the promise which they have made, and that if they had
considered the matter as much before they promised as they have since, they
should not have promised. Therefore they take the liberty to set their own
promises aside. Besides, sometimes persons violate this command, by neglecting
to fulfill their engagements, through a careless, negligent spirit.
They violate this command, in withholding what belongs
to their neighbor, when they are not faithful in any business which they have
undertaken to do for their neighbor. If their neighbor [has] hired them to labor
for him for a certain time, and they be not careful well to husband the time; if
they be hired to a day’s labor, and be not careful to improve the day, as they
have reason to think that he who hired justly expected of them; or if they be
hired to accomplish such a piece of work, and be not careful to do it well, do
it not as if it were for themselves, or as they would have others do for them,
when they in like manner betrust them with any business of theirs; or if they be
entrusted with any particular affair, which they undertake, but use not that
care, contrivance, and diligence, to manage it so as will be to the advantage of
him who entrusts them, and as they would manage it, or would insist that it
should be managed, if the affair was their own: in all these cases the unjustly
withhold what belongs to their neighbor.
Second, another
way in which men unjustly withhold what is their neighbor’s is in neglecting
to pay their debts. Sometimes this happens, because they run so far into
debt that they cannot reasonably hope to be able to pay their debts; and this
they do, either through pride and affectation of living above their
circumstances, or through a grasping, covetous disposition, or some other
corrupt principle. Sometimes they neglect to pay their debts from carelessness
of spirit about it, little concerning themselves whether they are paid or not,
taking no care to go to their creditor, or to send to him. And if they see him
from time to time, they say nothing about their debts. Sometimes they neglect to
pay their debts, because it would put them to some inconvenience. The reason why
they do it not, is not because they cannot do it, but because they cannot do it
so conveniently as they desire. And so they rather choose to put their creditor
to inconvenience by being without what properly belongs to him, than to put
themselves to inconvenience by being without what doth not belong to them, and
what they have no right to detain. In any of these cases they unjustly usurp the
property of their neighbor.
Sometimes persons have that by them with which they
could pay their debts if they would. But they want to lay out their money for
something else, to buy gay clothing for their children, or to advance their
estates, or for some such end. They have other designs in hand, which must fail,
if they pay their debts. When men thus withhold what is due, they unjustly usurp
what is not their own. Sometimes they neglect to pay their debts, and their
excuse for it is that their creditor doth not need it; that he hath a plentiful
estate, and can well bear to lie out of his money. But if the creditor be ever
so rich, that gives no right to the debtor to withhold from him that which
belongs to him. If it be due, it ought to be paid. For that is the very notion
of its being due. It is no more lawful to withhold from a man what is his due,
without his consent, because he is rich and able to do without it, than it is
lawful to steal from a man because he is rich, and able to bear the loss.
SECTION II
The dishonesty of unjustly taking
a neighbor’s property.
The principal ways of doing this seem to be these four,
by negligence, by fraud, by violence, or by stealing strictly so called.
First, the
first way of unjustly depriving our neighbor of that which is his, is by
negligence, by carelessly neglecting that which is expected by neighbors,
one of another, and is necessary to prevent our neighbor’s suffering in his
estate by us, or by anything that is ours: and necessary in order that neighbors
may live one by another, without suffering in their lawful interests, rights,
and possessions, one by another.
For instance, when proper care is not taken by men to
prevent their neighbor’s suffering in the produce of his fields or enclosures,
from their cattle, or other brute creatures; which may be either through
negligence with regard to their creatures themselves, in keeping those that are
unruly, and giving them their liberty, though they know that they are not fit to
have their liberty, and are commonly wont to break into their neighbor’s
enclosures greatly to his damage; or through a neglect of that which is justly
expected of them, to defend others’ fields from suffering by the neighborhood of
their own. In such cases men are guilty of unjustly taking from their neighbor
what is his property.
It is said in the law of Moses, Exo. 22:5, “If a man
shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall put in his beast, and
shall feed in another man’s field; of the best of his own field, and of the best
of his vineyard, shall he make restitution.” Now a man may be unjustly the cause
of his neighbor’s field or vineyard being eaten, either by putting in his beast,
and so doing what he should not do; or by neglecting to do what he should do, to
prevent his beast from getting into his field. What is said in the 144th Psalm,
and two last verses, supposes that a people who carry themselves as becomes a
people whose God is the Lord, will take thorough care that beasts do not break
into their neighbor’s enclosures. “That our oxen may be strong to labour; that
there be no breaking in, nor going out; that there be no
complaining in our streets. Happy is that people that is in such a case; yea
happy is that people whose God is the Lord.”
Second, taking
away that which is our neighbor’s by fraud, or by deceiving him, is
another mode of usurping our neighbor’s property. This is the case when men in
their dealings take advantage of their neighbor’s ignorance, or oversight, or
mistake, to get something from him; or when they make their gains, by concealing
the defects of what they sell, putting off bad for good, though this be not done
by speaking falsely, but only by keeping silence. Or when they take a higher
price than what they sell is really worth, and more than they could get for it
if the concealed defects were known. Or when they sell that for good, which
indeed is not merchantable, which is condemned in Amos 8:6, “Yea, and sell the
refuse of the wheat.”
If a man puts off something to another with defects that
are concealed, knowing that the other receives it as good, and pays such a price
for it, under a notion of its having no remarkable defect but what he sees, and
takes the price which the buyer under that notion offers; the seller knows that
he takes a price of the buyer for that which the buyer had not of him; for the
buyer is deceived, and pays for those things which he finds wanting in what he
buys. It is just the same thing, as if a man should take a payment that another
offers him, through a mistake, for that which he never had of him, thinking that
he had it of him, when he had it not.
So a man fraudulently takes away that which is his
neighbor’s, when he gets his money from him by falsely commending what he hath
to sell, above what he knows to be the true quality of it; and attributes those
good qualities to it which he knows it has not. Or if he does not that, yet sets
forth the good qualities in a degree beyond what he knows to be the true degree;
or speaks of the defects and ill qualities of what he has to sell, as if they
were much less than he knows they are. Or on the contrary, when the buyer will
cry down what he is about to buy, contrary to his real opinion of the value of
it. - These things, however common they be in men’s dealings one with another,
are nothing short of iniquity, and fraud, and a great breach of this
commandment, upon which we are discoursing. Pro. 20:14, “It is nought, it is
nought, saith the buyer; but when he is gone his way then he boasteth.” - Many
other ways there are whereby men deceive one another in their trading, and
whereby they fraudulently and unjustly take away that which is their
neighbor’s.
Third, another
mode of unjustly invading and taking away our neighbor’s property, is by
violence. This violence may be done in different degrees. - Men may take
away their neighbor’s goods either by mere open violence, either making use of
superior strength, forcibly taking away anything that is his; or by express or
implicit threatenings forcing him to yield up what he has into their hands; as
is done in open robbery and piracy. Or, by making use of some advantages which
they have over their neighbor, in their dealings with him, constrain him to
yield to their gaining unreasonably of him; as when they take advantage of their
neighbor’s poverty to extort unreasonably from him for those things that he is
under a necessity of procuring for himself or family. This is an oppression
against which God hath shown a great displeasure in his word. Lev. 25:14, “And
if thou sell ought unto thy neighbour, or buyest ought of thy neighbour, ye
shall not oppress one another.” Pro. 22:22, 23, “Rob not the poor, because he is
poor, neither oppress the afflicted in the gate; for the Lord will plead their
cause, and spoil the soul of those that spoiled them.” And Amos 4:1, 2, “Hear
this word, ye kine of Bashan, that are in the mount of Samaria, which oppress
the poor, which crush the needy, the Lord hath sworn in his holiness, that he
will take you away with hooks, and your posterity with fishhooks.”
When the necessity of poor indigent people is the very
thing whence others take occasion to raise the price of provisions, even above
the market; this is such an oppression. There are many poor people whose
families are in such necessity of bread, that they in their extremity will give
almost any price for it, rather than go without it. Those who have to sell,
though hereby they have an advantage in their hands, yet surely should not take
the advantage to raise the price of provisions. We should doubtless think we had
just cause to complain, if we were in such necessity as they are, and were
reduced to their straits, and were treated in this manner. And let us remember,
that it is owing only to the distinguishing goodness of God to us, that we are
not in their circumstances. And whatever our present circumstances are, yet we
know not but that the time may still come when their case may be ours.
Men may oppress others, though they be not poor, if they
will take advantage of any particular necessities of their neighbor,
unreasonably to extort from him. The case may be so at particular seasons, that
those who are not poor, may stand in particular and extraordinary need of what
we have, or what we can do for them. So that it would be greatly to their
disadvantage or loss to be without it. Now to take advantage of their urgent
circumstances, to get from them an unreasonable price, is a violent dealing with
our neighbors.
It is very unreasonable to say, Such men are so rich,
and get money so much more easily than I, that it is no hurt for me to take
advantage when they are in special need, and make them give me, for work that I
do for them, a great deal more than I would desire to ask of other men. Let such
consider, whether, if they should by any means hereafter get forward in the
world, and come to have plentiful estates, they would like that persons should
act upon such principles towards them. That men are rich, gives us no more right
to take away from them what is theirs in this way, than it does to steal from
them because they come easily by their property, and can do without it better
than we.
Again, another thing that is a kind of violent taking
from our neighbor what is his, is taking the advantage of the law to gain from
others, when their cause in honesty and conscience is just and good. The
circumstances of mankind, their rights, possessions, and dealings one with
another, are so various, that it is impossible that any body of human laws
should be contrived to suit all possible cases and circumstances. Hence the best
laws may be abused and perverted to purposes contrary to the general design of
laws, which is to maintain the rights and secure the properties of mankind.
Human laws have a regard due to them, but always in subordination to the higher
laws of God and nature. Therefore when it so happens, that we have an advantage
by the law, to gain what the laws of moral honesty allow not, it is an
oppression and violence to take the advantage. That human laws allow it, will
not excuse us before God, the Judge of the world, who will judge us another day
by his own laws and not by the laws of the commonwealth.
Fourth, the
fourth way of unjustly taking from our neighbor that which is his, is
stealing so called. All unjust ways of taking away, or invading, or
usurping what is our neighbor’s, are called stealing in the most extensive use
of the word, and all in included in the expression in this command. Yet the word
stealing, as it is more commonly used, is not of so great extent, and intends
not all unjust invasion of our neighbor’s property, but only a particular kind
of unjust taking. So that in common speech when we speak of fraudulent dealings,
of extortion, unfaithfulness in our trust, and of stealing, we understand
different sins by these expressions, though they are an usurpation of what is
our neighbor’s.
Stealing, strictly so called, may be thus defined. A
designed taking of our neighbor’s goods from him, without his consent or
knowledge. It is not merely a withholding of what is our neighbor’s, but a
taking away. And therein it differs from unfaithfulness in our undertakings and
betrustments, and also from negligence in the payment of debts. It is a designed
or willful depriving of our neighbor of what is his, and so differs from
wronging our neighbor in his estate through carelessness or negligence. It is
taking of our neighbor’s goods without his knowledge. It is a private,
clandestine taking away, and so differs from robbery by open violence.
So also it differs from extortion, for in that the
person knows what is taken from him. The aim of him that takes is no other than
that he should know it; for he makes use of other means than his ignorance, to
obtain what is his neighbors, viz. violence to constrain him to give it
up. So also it differs from fraudulent dealing or trading. For though in
fraudulent dealing, the lawful possessor doth not understand the ways and means,
by which he parts with his goods, and by which his neighbor becomes possessed of
them; yet he knows the fact; the deceiver designedly conceals the
manner only. But in stealing, strictly so called, he that takes, intends
not that it shall be known that he takes. It also differs from extortion
and fraudulent dealing, in that it is wholly without the consent of the owner.
For in extortion, though there be no free consent; yet the consent of the owner
is in some sort gained, though by oppressive means. So in fraudulent dealing
consent is in some sort obtained, though it be by deceit. But in stealing no
kind of consent is obtained.
A person may steal from another, yet not take his goods
without the knowledge of the owner; because he may know of it accidentally, he
may see what is done, unawares to the thief. Therefore I have defined stealing,
a designed taking without the consent or knowledge of the owner. If it be
accidentally known, yet it is not known in the design and intention of the
thief. The thief is so far at least private in it, that he gives no notice to
the owner at the time. It must be also without the consent of the owner. A
person may take without the knowledge of the owner, and yet not take without his
consent. The owner may not know of his taking at the time, or of his taking any
particular things; yet there may be his implicit consent. There may have been a
general consent, if not expressed, yet implied. The circumstances of the affair
may be such, that his consent may well be presumed upon, either from an
established custom, allowed by all, or from the nature of the case; the thing
being of such a nature, that it may well be presumed that none would refuse
their consent; as in the case of a person’s accidentally passing through his
neighbor’s vineyard in Israel, and eating his fill of grapes; or from the
circumstances of the persons, as is the case, in many instances, of the freedom
which near neighbors and intimate friends often take, and of that boldness which
they use with respect to each other’s goods.
In all such cases, though the owner [does] not
particularly know what is done, yet he that takes, does it not with any
contrived designed concealment. And though there is no express, particular
consent, yet there is a consent either implied, or justly presumed upon. And he
that takes, doth not designedly do it without consent.
It may happen in some cases, that one may take the goods
of another both without his knowledge and consent, either explicit or implicit,
but through mistake; yet he may not be guilty of stealing. Therefore the
design of him who takes must come into consideration. When he designedly
takes away that which is his neighbor’s, without his consent or knowledge, then
he steals. So that if it should happen, that he has both his consent and
knowledge, without his design, he steals. And if it so happen that he takes
without either his neighbor’s consent or knowledge, and yet without his own
design, he steals not. I desire therefore that this, which I take to be the true
definition of theft or stealing, may be borne in mind, viz. a designed
taking of our neighbor’s goods, without his consent or knowledge; because it is
needful to clear up many things which I have yet to say on this subject.
SECTION III
Dishonest
excuses.
Here I shall particularly take notice of some
things, by which persons may be ready to excuse themselves, in privately taking
their neighbor’s good, which however cannot be a just excuse for it, nor will
they make such a taking to be stealing.
First, that the person whose goods are privately
taken, owes or is in debt to him that takes them. Some may be ready to
say that they do not take that which is their neighbor’s, they take that which
is their own, because as much is due to them, their neighbor owes them as much,
and unjustly detains it, and they know not whether ever they shall get their due
of him. Their neighbor will not do them right, and therefore they must right
themselves.
But such pleas as these will not justify a
man in going in a private and clandestine manner to take away anything of his
neighbor’s from his possession, without his consent or knowledge; his doing this
is properly stealing. For though something of his neighbor’s, which is as
valuable as what he takes, may be due to him; that doth not give him such a
right to his neighbor’s goods, that he may take anything that is his, according
to his own pleasure, and at what time and in what manner he pleases. That his
neighbor is in debt to him, doth not give him a right to take it upon himself to
be his own judge, so that he may judge for himself, which of his neighbor’s
goods shall be taken from him to discharge the debt; and that he may act merely
according to his own private judgment and pleasure in such a case, without so
much as acquainting his neighbor with the affair.
In order to warrant such a proceeding as
this, everything that his neighbor has, must be his. A man may not take
indifferently what he pleases out of a number of goods, without the consent or
knowledge of any other person, unless all is his own, to be disposed of as he
pleases. Such a way of using goods according to our own pleasure, taking what we
will, and at what time we will, can be warranted by nothing but a dominion over
the whole. And though he who is in debt may be guilty of great injustice in
detaining what is due to another; yet it doth not thence follow, but that he
that takes from him, may also be guilty of great injustice towards him. The
course he takes to right himself may be very irregular and unreasonable; and
such a course, that if universally allowed and pursued in such cases, would
throw human society into confusion.
When men obtain a property in any of the
professions of this life, they are at the same time also invested with a right
to retain a possession of them, till they are deprived of them in some fair and
regular proceeding. Every man has a right to hold his estate, and keep
possession of his properties, so that no other can lawfully use them as his own,
until he either parts with them of his own accord, or until it be taken from him
according to some established rule, in a way of open justice. Therefore he who,
under pretense of having just demands upon his neighbor, privately takes his
goods without his consent, takes them unjustly, and is guilty of stealing.
Second, much less will it make such a private taking
not to be stealing, that he who takes, has, in way of kindness or gift, done for
the person from whom he takes, as much is equivalent to the value of what
he takes. If a man do his neighbor some considerable kindness, whether in labor,
or in something that he gives him, what he does or gives is supposed to be done
voluntarily, and he is not to make his neighbor debtor for it. And therefore if
anything be privately taken away, upon any such consideration, it is gross
stealing.
For instance, when any person needs to have
any services done for him, where a considerable number of hands are necessary;
it is common for the neighborhood to meet together and join in helping their
neighbor, and frequently some provision is made for their entertainment. If any
person who hath assisted on such an occasion, and is a partaker at such an
entertainment, shall think within himself, the service I have done is worth a
great deal more than what I shall eat and drink here, and therefore shall take
liberty privately to take of the provision set before him, to carry away with
him, purposely concealing the matter from him who hath entertained him, this is
gross stealing. And it is a very ridiculous plea which they make to excuse so
unmanly and vile an act.
Persons in such cases may say to themselves,
that the provision is made for them, and set before them; that it is a time
wherein considerable liberty is given, and they think, seeing they have done so
much for their host, they may take something more than they eat and drink there.
But then let them be open in it; let them acquaint those with it who make the
entertainment; and let it not be done in any wise, in a secret, clandestine
manner, with the least design or attempt to avoid their notice. On the contrary,
let care be taken to give them notice and obtain their consent.
When persons do such things in a private
manner, they condemn themselves by their own act. Their doing what they do
secretly, shows that they are conscious to themselves, that they go beyond what
it is expected they should do, and do what would not be allowed, if it were
known. Such an act, however light they may make of it, is abominable theft, and
what any person of religion or any sense of the dignity of their own nature,
would to the greatest degree abhor and detest.
Third, it is not sufficient to make a private
taking without consent not to be stealing, that it is but a small matter that is
taken. If the thing be of little value, yet if it be worth a purposed concealing
from the owner, the value is great enough to render the taking of it proper
theft. If it be pretended that the thing is of so small consequence, that it is
not worth asking for; then surely it is not worth a purposed concealing from the
owner, when it is taken. He who, under this pretense, conceals his taking, in
the very act contradicts his own pretense; for his action shows that he
apprehends, or at least suspects, that, as small a matter as it is, the owner
would not like the taking of it, if he knew it; otherwise the taker would not
desire to conceal it.
The owner of the goods, and not other people,
is the proper judge, whether what he owns be of such a value, that it is worth
his while to keep it, and to refuse his consent to the taking of it from him. He
who possesses, and not he who takes away, has a right to judge of what
consequence his possessions are to him. He has a right to set what value he
pleases on them, and to treat them according to that value. Besides, merely that
a thing is of small value, cannot give a right to others, purposely and
designedly to take it away, without the knowledge or consent of the owner.
Because if this only gives a right, then all have a right to take things of
small value; and at this rate a great number of persons, each of them taking
from a man that which is of small value, might take away all he has.
Therefore, it will not justify persons, in
purposely taking such things as fruit from the trees, or gardens, or fields of
their neighbors, without their knowledge or consent, that the things which they
take are things of small value. Nor is that sufficient to render such an act not
an act of theft properly so called. This shows also that the smallness of the
value of what is privately taken at feasts and entertainments, doth not render
the taking of such things not stealing.
The small value of a thing may in some cases
justify an occasional taking of things, so far as we may from thence, and from
what is generally allowed, reasonably presume that the owner gives his consent.
But if that be the case, and persons really take, as supposing that the owner
consents to such occasional taking, then he that takes will not at all endeavor
to do what he does secretly, nor in any measure to avoid notice. But merely the
smallness of the value of a thing, can never justify a secret taking of what is
another’s.
SECTION IV
The subject applied. -
The dishonest warned.
The first use I would make of this doctrine,
is to warn against all injustice and dishonesty, as to what appertains to
our neighbor’s temporal goods or possessions. Let me warn all to avoid all ways
of unjustly invading or usurping what is their neighbor’s, and let me press that
exhortation of the apostle, Rom. 12:17, “Provide things honest in the sight of
all men;” which implies, that those things which we provide for ourselves, and
use as our own, should be such as we come honestly by; and especially that we
should avoid all clandestine or underhand ways of obtaining anything that
is our neighbor’s, either by fraudulent dealing, or by that taking without our
neighbor’s knowledge and consent, of which we have been speaking.
I warn you to beware of dishonesty in
withholding what is your neighbor’s, either by unfaithfulness to your trust in
any business which you undertake, or by withholding your neighbor’s just and
honest dues. Consider that saying of the apostle, Rom. 13:8, “Owe no man any
thing, but to love one another.” Be also warned against wronging your neighbor
or injuring him in his enclosures, or in any of his just rights and properties,
through careless neglect of what is reasonably expected by neighbors one of
another, in order that they may live one by another without mutual injury. Let
all beware that they bring not guilt on their souls in the sight of God, by
taking an advantage to oppress any person. Especially beware of taking advantage
of others’ poverty to extort from them. For God will defend their cause, and you
will be no gainers by such oppression.
Beware also of all injustice by deceitful and
fraudulent dealing. You doubtless meet with abundance of temptation to fraud,
and have need to keep a strong guard upon yourselves. There are many temptations
to falsehood in trading, both about what you would buy and what you have to
sell. There are, in buying, temptations to do as in Pro. 20:14, “It is nought,
it is nought, saith the buyer.” There are many temptations to take indirect
courses, to blind those with whom you deal, about the qualities of what you have
to sell, to diminish the defects of your commodities, or to conceal them, and to
put off things for good, which are bad. And there are doubtless many other ways
that men meet with temptations to deceive others, which your own experience will
better suggest to you than I can.
But here I shall take occasion to speak of a
particular kind of fraud, which is very aggravated, and is rather a defrauding
of God than man. What I mean is, the giving of that which is bad for good in
public contributions. Though it be matter of great shame and lamentation
that it should be so, yet it is to be feared, from what has sometimes been
observed, that there are some who, when there is a public contribution to be
made for the poor, or some other pious and charitable use, sometimes take that
opportunity to put off their bad money. That which they find, or think,
their neighbors will refuse to take at their hands, because they will have
opportunity to see what is offered them, and to observe the badness of it, even
that they therefore take opportunity to put off to God.
Hereby they endeavor to save their credit;
for they apprehend that they shall be concealed. They appear with others to go
to the contribution, as it is not known, but that they put in that which is
good. But they cheat the church of God, and defraud the expectations of the
poor, or rather, they lie to God, for those who receive what is given, stand as
Christ’s receivers, and not as acting for themselves in this matter.
They that do thus, do that which is very much
of the same nature with that sin, against which God denounces that dreadful
curse in Mal. 1:14, “Cursed be the deceiver which hath in his flock a male, and
voweth and sacrificeth unto the Lord a corrupt thing: for I am a great King,
saith the Lord of hosts, and my name is dreadful among the heathen.” That
hath in his flock a male, i.e. That has in his flock that which is good and
fit to be offered to God. For it was the male of the flock principally that was
appointed, in the law of Moses, to be offered in sacrifice. He has in his flock
that which is good, but he vows and sacrifices to the Lord “the torn, the lame,
and the sick.” As it is said in the foregoing verse; ye said also, “Behold what
a weariness is it, and ye have snuffed at it, saith the Lord of hosts; and ye
brought that which was torn, and the lame, and the sick; thus ye brought an
offering: should I accept this of your hands? Saith the Lord.”
Contributions in the Christian church come in
the room of sacrifices in the Jewish church. Mercy comes in the room of
sacrifice. And what is offered in the way of mercy is as much offered to God, as
the sacrifices of old were. For what is done to the poor is done to Christ, and
he that hath pity on the poor, lendeth to the Lord; Pro. 19:17. The Jews that
offered the sick and lame of the flock, knew that if they had offered it to
their governor, and had attempted to put it off, as part of the tribute or
public taxes due to their earthly rulers, it would not be accepted, and
therefore they were willing to put it off to God. “And if ye offer the blind for
sacrifice, is it not evil? And if ye offer the lame and sick, is it not evil?
Offer it now unto thy governor, will he be pleased with thee, or accept thy
person? Saith the Lord of hosts.”
So those persons who purposely put bad money
into contributions, know that what they put in would not be accepted if they
should offer to pay their public taxes. Yea, they know that their
neighbors would not accept it at their hands; and therefore they are
willing to save themselves, by putting it off to God.
This practice has also very much of the
nature of the sin of Ananias and Sapphira. What they offered was by way of
contribution for charitable uses. The brethren sold what they had, and brought
it into a common stock, and put all under the care of deacons, that the poor
might every one be supplied. Ananias and Sapphira brought a part of their
possessions, and put it into the common stock. And their sin was, that they put
it in for more than it really was. It was but a part of what they had, and they
put it in, and would have it accepted, as if it had been all. So those among us,
of whom I am speaking, put off what they put into the charitable stock, for more
than it is. For they put it in, under the notion that it is something of some
value. They intend it shall be so taken by the church that sees them go to the
contribution, when indeed they put in nothing at all.
Ananias and Sapphira were charged with lying
to God, and doing an act of fraud towards God himself, in what they did. Acts
5:4, “Whilst it remained, was it not thine own? And after it was sold, was it
not in thine own power? Why hast thou conceived this thing in thine heart? Thou
hast not lied unto men, but unto God.” So those who knowingly put bad money for
good into a contribution for a charitable use, as much as in them lies commit an
act of fraud and deceit towards God. For the deacons who receive what is
contributed, receive it not in their own names, but as Christ’s receivers. I
hope these things may be sufficient to deter every reader from ever daring to do
such a thing for the future.
Again, another thing I would warn you
against, is, stealing, properly and strictly so called; or designedly taking
away any of your neighbor’s goods without his consent or knowledge. And
especially I would now take occasion to warn against a practice which is very
common in the country, particularly among children and young people; and that
is, stealing fruit from their neighbor’s trees or enclosures. There is a
licentious liberty taken by many children and young people, in making bold with
their neighbor’s fruit. And it is to be feared, that they are too much
countenanced in it by their parents and many elder people.
I am sensible, that the great thing which is
pleaded, and made very much the ground of this liberty which is taken and so
much tolerated, is a very abusive and unreasonable construction and application
of that text of Scripture in Deu. 23:24, “When thou comest into thy neighbour’s
vineyard, then thou mayest eat grapes thy fill. But thou shalt not put any in
thy vessel.” Because this text seems to be so much mistaken and misimproved, I
shall therefore endeavor particularly to state the matter of persons taking
their neighbor’s fruit, and to set it in a just and clear light as concerning
this text.
It was to eat their fill of grapes when they
occasionally came into or passed through their neighbor’s vineyard, and
not that they should go thither on purpose to eat grapes. This is
manifest by the manner of expression; “When thou comest into thy
neighbour’s vineyard, thou mayest eat;” i.e. when thou art come thither
on some other occasion. If God had meant to give them leave to come thither on
purpose, for no other end, it would not have been expressed so; but rather thus,
Thou mayest come into thy neighbour’s vineyard, and eat grapes thy fill.
- Such were the circumstances of that people, and vineyards among them were so
common, that there was no danger that this liberty would be attended with ill
consequence. It is manifest throughout the history of Israel, that vineyards
among them were so common that the people in general had them. Every husbandman
among them was a vine-dresser; and a great part of the business of a husbandman
among them, consisted in dressing and taking care of his vineyards. Grapes seem
to have been the most common sort of fruit that they had. Besides, there was no
liberty given for persons to go on purpose to a vineyard to eat the fruit of it.
So that there was no danger of neighbors suffering one by another, by any such
liberty. - The liberty did not tend to any such consequence, as the flocking of
a great number to eat grapes, whereby the fruit of the vineyard might be much
diminished.
Such were the circumstances of the case, that
the consent of the owners of vineyards in general might well be presumed upon,
though no such express liberty had been given. You may remember that in the
definition of stealing, I observed, that explicit consent is not always
necessary; because the case may be so circumstanced, that consent may be well
presumed on. And the reason why consent might well be presumed on in the case of
eating grapes, of which we are now speaking, is, that there could be no sensible
injury, nor any danger of any ill consequences, by which a man would sensibly
suffer in the benefit of his vineyard. Hence it is the more easy to determine,
what would and what would not be justified by this text, among us. Suppose a
particular person among us had a vineyard of the same kind with those which the
children of Israel had, it would not justify others in using the same liberty
when occasionally passing through it; because it would be a rare thing, and the
rarity and scarcity of the fruit would render it of much greater value. Besides,
if one man [was] distinguished by such a possession, to allow of such a liberty
would have a much greater tendency to ill consequences, than if they were
common, as they were in the land of Canaan. There would be danger of many
persons falsely pretending, and making occasions, to pass through the vineyard,
for the sake of such rare fruit.
Nor would it be a parallel case, if men in
general among us had each of them a few vines. That would be a very
different thing from persons in general having large vineyards. Nor would this
text, in such a case, warrant men’s eating their fill of grapes when
occasionally passing by. - And though all in general had vineyards, as they had
in the land of Canaan, this text would not justify men in going into their
neighbor’s vineyard on purpose to eat the fruit. No such liberty is given in the
text. If there had been such liberty, it might have been of ill consequence. For
the sake of saving their own grapes, men might make a practice of going and
sending their children into their neighbor’s vineyard, to eat their fill from
time to time.
But the liberty given in this text to the
children of Israel, seems to be very parallel with the liberty taken among us,
to take up an apple or two and eat, as we are occasionally passing through a
neighbor’s orchard; which, as our circumstances are, we may do, and justly
presume that we have the owner’s consent. This is a liberty that we take, and
find no ill consequences. It was very much so with vineyards in the land of
Canaan, as it is with orchards among us. Apples in some countries are a rare
fruit. And there it would by no means be warrantable for persons to take the
same liberty when occasionally passing by their neighbor’s apple tree, which we
warrantably take here, when going through a neighbor’s orchard.
The consideration of these things will easily
show the great abuse that is made of this text, when it is brought to justify
such a resorting of children and others to their neighbor’s fruit trees, as is
sometimes, on purpose to take and eat the fruit. Indeed this practice is not
only not justified by the law of Moses, but it is in itself unreasonable, and
contrary to the law of nature. The consequences of it are pernicious, so that a
man can have no dependence on enjoying the fruit of his labor, or the benefit of
his property in those things, which possibly he may very much value. He can have
no assurance but that he shall be mainly deprived of what he has, and that
others will not have the principal benefit of it; and so that his end in
planting and cultivating that from which he expected those fruits of the earth,
which God hath given for the use, comfort, and delight of mankind, will not be
in the main frustrated.
SECTION V
An exhortation to
honesty.
Under this use, I shall confine myself to two
particulars, many other things having been already spoken to.
First, I shall hence take occasion to exhort
parents to restrain the children from stealing, and particularly from
being guilty of theft in stealing the fruits of their neighbor’s trees or
fields. Christian parents are obliged to bring up their children in the nurture
and admonition of the Lord. But how much otherwise do they act, who bring them
up in theft! And those parents are guilty of this, who - though they do not
directly teach them to steal, by example and setting them about it, yet -
tolerate them in it.
Parents should take effectual care, not only
to instruct their children better, and to warn them against any such thievish
practices, but also thoroughly to restrain them. Children who practice stealing,
make themselves vile. Stealing, by the common consent of mankind, is a very vile
practice. Therefore those parents that will not take thorough care to restrain
their children from such a practice, will be guilty of the same sin which God so
highly resented, and awfully punished, in Eli, of which we read, 1 Sam. 3:13,
“For I have told him, that I will judge his house for ever, for the iniquity
which he knoweth; because his sons made themselves vile, and he restrained them
not.”
Second, I exhort those who are conscious in
themselves that they have heretofore wronged their neighbor to make
restitution. This is a duty the obligation to which is exceedingly plain.
If a person was wronged in taking away anything that was his, certainly
he is wronged also in detaining it. And all the while that a person, who
has been guilty of wronging his neighbor, neglects to make restitution, he lives
in that wrong. He not only lives impenitent as to that first wrong of which he
was guilty, but he continually wrongs his neighbor. A man who hath gotten
anything from another wrongfully, goes on to wrong him every day that he
neglects to restore it, when he has opportunity to do it. The person injured did
not only suffer wrong from the other when his goods were first taken from him,
but he suffers new injustice from him all the while they are unjustly kept from
him.
Therefore I counsel you who are conscious
that you have heretofore wronged your neighbor, either by fraud, or oppression,
or unfaithfulness, or stealing, whether lately or formerly, though it may have
been a great while ago, speedily to go and make restitution for all the wrong
your neighbor has suffered at your hands. That it was done long ago, doth not
quit you from obligation to restore. This is a duty with which you must comply;
you cannot be acquitted without it. As long as you neglect it, it will be
unreasonable in you to expect any forgiveness of God. For what ground can you
have to think that God will pardon you, as long as you willfully continue in the
same wrong, and wrong the same many still every day, by detaining from him that
which is his? You in your prayers ask of God, that he would forgive all your
sins; but your very prayers are mockery, if you still willfully continue in
those sins. - Indeed, if you go and confess your faults to your neighbor, and he
will freely acquit you from making restitution, you will be acquitted from the
obligation. For in so doing, your neighbor gives you what before was his. But
otherwise you cannot be acquitted.
I would leave this advice with all, for
direction in their behavior on their deathbeds. Indeed you should not by any
means put it off till you come to die; and you will run the most fearful risk in
so doing. But if you will not do it now, while you are in health, I will leave
it with you to remember, when you shall come to lie on your deathbeds.
Doubtless, then if you have the use of your reason, you will be concerned for
the salvation of your poor souls. And let this be one thing then remembered, as
absolutely necessary in order to your salvation, that before you die, you must
make restitution for whatever wrong you shall have done any of your neighbors;
or at least leave orders that such restitution be made. Otherwise you will, as
it were, go out of the world, and go before your great Judge, with stolen goods
in your hands. And certainly it will not be very comfortable or safe, to bring
them into his infinitely holy and dreadful presence, when he sits on his throne
of judgment, with his eyes as a flame of fire, being more pure than to look on
iniquity; when he is about to sentence you to your everlasting unalterable
state.
[ Thanks to: Jonathan-Edwards.org ]